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A Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set is meant to model a standard of be-
haviour within an ongoing social interaction: it consists of a set of alternative
outcomes that do not occasion serious objections against each other, while
providing strong objections against any other available alternative. The use
of Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets (henceforth VNM-stable sets) as
a solution concept for coalitional games has a long tradition dating back to
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1953)). Since then, VNM-stable sets and kernels of irre￿ exive simple di-
graphs, their dual graph-theoretic counterpart, have been the main focus of
a substantial ￿ ow of literature (see e.g. Harary, Norman and Cartwright
(1965) for an early, classic graph-theoretic treatment, Schmidt and Str￿hlein
(1985) and Ghoshal, Laskar and Pillone(1998) for comprehensive surveys cov-
ering the game-theoretic and the graph-theoretic literature, and Greenberg
(1990) for a highly stimulating if controversial attempt at using VNM-stable
sets as an unifying solution scheme for both cooperative and noncooperative
game theory).
Now, consider the interaction underlying the ongoing operation of an
organization, a team or indeed any suitably complex decision-making sys-
tem. Clearly enough, if the set of available options happens to change at a
faster pace than the behavioural attitudes of the relevant players and the lat-
ter interact as predicted by VNM-stable sets, then the corresponding choice
behaviour of the system should be related in certain speci￿c ways to the
dominance digraph (to be de￿ned below) representing the underlying inter-
action process, and the resulting choice function should somehow reveal that
fact. But then, what are the characteristic features of such a choice function,
hence the testable behavioural predictions of VNM-stable sets as a solution
concept? Or to put it more succinctly, which choice functions may be re-
garded as revealed VNM-solutions?
To the best of the author￿ s knowledge, such an issue has never been
addressed in its full generality. To be sure, there exist at least two remark-
able contributions to that topic, namely Wilson (1970) and Suzumura (1983),
that consider a class of revealed VNM-solutions in the wider setting of partial
choice functions, i.e. choice functions as possibly de￿ned on just some sub-
sets of the ￿ universal￿outcome set. In particular, the seminal Wilson(1970)
-which is by the way mainly focused on rationalizability by total preorders
and strict partial orders- is to be credited for pointing out the pivotal role
1of the revealed conjugation relation (to be de￿ned below) when it comes to
identifying VNM-solutions. However, Wilson (1970) is only concerned with
proper i.e. nonempty-valued partial choice functions. Thus, it only provides
a characterization of nonempty-valued revealed VNM-solutions. Moreover,
its characterization of such subclass of revealed VNM-solutions does not re-
fer to VNM-stable sets of a dominance digraph, but rather to the crypto-
morphic notion of (a suitably de￿ned type of) ￿xed point solutions of an
undominance or re￿ exive digraph, and relies on a single condition which
makes explicit reference to revealed conjugation relations. Thus, such a con-
dition is in fact rather cumbersome and scarcely amenable to comparisons
with other, simpler properties of choice functions as currently used in related
characterization problems and results. For instance, Wilson￿ s condition and
related characterization makes it scarcely possible to single out the peculiar
combination of contraction-consistency and expansion-consistency properties
of choice sets which is characteristic of VNM-solutions as opposed to, say,
core-solutions or total-preorder-maximizing choice functions.
Relying on Wilson￿ s work, Suzumura (1983) o⁄ers a similar character-
ization of an even smaller subclass of (nonempty-valued) revealed VNM-
solutions by means of a single condition. Indeed, Suzumura does proceed to
unpack such a condition via a set of simpler and more familiar properties,
to the e⁄ect of producing a further, and much more transparent character-
ization. But of course, as just mentioned, Suzumura￿ s result only concerns
a very specialized class of nonempty-valued VNM-solutions, namely those
proper choice functions that may be regarded as both VNM-solutions and
core-solutions of a suitably de￿ned, asymmetric revealed dominance digraph.
Now, it is of course well-known that there exist nontrivial dominance
digraphs with induced subdigraphs having no VNM-stable sets, hence gen-
erating locally empty-valued VNM-solutions. Thus, the Wilson-Suzumura
theorems mentioned above concern anyway just some proper subclasses of
the entire collection of revealed VNM-solutions of an arbitrary (namely, ir-
re￿exive) dominance digraph.
Of course, that paucity and incompleteness of contributions on revealed
VNM-solutions is to be contrasted with the impressive body of literature
on ￿ revealed preference￿ i.e. essentially on revealed maximization in dif-
ferent domains (see e.g. among many others Sen (1971,1977), Suzumura
(1983), Moulin (1985), Aizerman and Aleskerov (1995), Danilov and Ko-
shevoy (2009)). Moreover, there exists some work on several revealed (nonempty-
valued) tournament solutions and their general characterizations (see e.g.
2the seminal Moulin (1986), and Laslier (1997), Ehlers and Sprumont (2008),
Lombardi (2008, 2009)), and on characterizations of revealed noncooperative
equilibrium behaviour for some wide classes of games admitting equilibria
(e.g. Yanovskaya (1980), Ray and Zhou (2001), Galambos (2005)). Clearly,
this state of a⁄airs may be partly explained by the traditional emphasis
on domains that ensure nonempty sets of solutions of the required type.
Nevertheless, it is striking that a general characterization of revealed VNM-
solutions is still missing, while the only known characterization of nonempty-
valued VNM-solutions due to Wilson(1970) as discussed above is arguably
somewhat opaque.
The present paper is aimed at ￿lling this gap in the literature by address-
ing the general VNM-solution revelation problem as formulated above both
for proper and for possibly empty-valued choice functions. The ￿rst task to
accomplish is to devise a simple, transparent characterization of the class of
all nonempty-valued VNM-solutions, based upon pure choice-theoretic prop-
erties with no direct reference to ￿ revealed￿binary relations (along the lines of
Suzumura￿ s results about the specialized subclass of nonempty-valued VNM￿
and-core-solutions as mentioned above). The second objective is to character-
ize at last the entire collection of VNM-solutions. Accordingly, two character-
ization results are provided: the ￿rst one concerns revealed VNM-solutions
under VNM-perfection of the revealed dominance digraph (i.e. existence
of VNM-stable sets at any subset) hence refers to proper choice functions,
o⁄ering an useful, more transparent alternative to Wilson￿ s own characteriza-
tion, while the second one covers the case of arbitrary, possibly empty-valued,
choice functions. In particular, a characterization of nonempty-valued VNM-
solutions based upon two new, simple pure choice-theoretic properties is of-
fered. Moreover, it turns out that two very mild-looking local nonemptiness
conditions for choice sets and a somewhat more ad hoc ￿ boundary￿property
forbidding the existence of certain VNM-stable sets are all that is needed in
order to lift that characterization to the more general case of arbitrary VNM-
solutions. From a more substantive perspective, and apart from the latter
￿ boundary￿property, both of those characterizations rely on a combination
of nonemptiness requirements for choice sets and of two weakened versions
of the Cherno⁄contraction-consistency property (also known in the relevant
literature as ￿ heritage￿ , ￿ heredity￿ , or ￿ ￿ contraction-consistency￿ ) as applied
to choice sets and rejection sets, respectively.
Finally, the foregoing characterizations enable a global study of the cor-
responding posets of revealed VNM-solutions: the basic properties of such
3posets are also brie￿ y analysed.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 is devoted to a presentation
of the model, of the two characterization results; section 3 presents the basic
properties of the posets of revealed VNM-solutions and revealed nonempty-
valued VNM-solutions, respectively, as mentioned above; section 4 comprises
the main characterization results; section 5 is devoted to a study of the ba-
sic order-theoretic structure of the set of revealed VNM-solutions; section
6 includes a discussion of the related literature; section 7 consists of a few
concluding remarks. An Appendix details a coalitional (strategic) represen-
tation for irre￿ exive (asymmetric) simple digraphs in order to illustrate the
full game-theoretic import of the results presented in this paper.
2 Choice functions and revealed VNM-solutions:
basic de￿nitions and examples
Let X be a set denoting the ￿ universal￿outcome set, with cardinality #X ￿ 3,
and P(X) its power set. It is also assumed for the sake of convenience that
X is ￿nite (but it should be remarked that the bulk of the ensuing analysis
is easily lifted to the case of an in￿nite outcome set). A choice function on
X is a de￿ationary operator on P(X) i.e. a function c : P(X) ! P(X) such
that c(A) ￿ A for any A ￿ X (empty choice sets are allowed, but we only
focus on choice functions that are de￿ned on the ￿ full￿domain P(X); a set
A ￿ X is also referred to as an agenda or menu, and is said to be rejected
by c if c(A) = ?, and accepted otherwise). A choice function c is proper (or
nonempty-valued) if c(A) 6= ? whenever ? 6= A ￿ X, and single-valued if
#c(A) = 1 for any nonempty A ￿ X. We denote by CX the set of all choice
functions on X, by C￿
X the set of all proper choice functions on X, and by
C1
X the set of all single-valued choice functions on X: clearly, by de￿nition,
C1
X ￿ C￿
X ￿ CX. Notice that any c 2 CX fully determines its dual choice or
rejection function cc by the rule: for any A ￿ X, cc(A) = A n c(A); clearly,
cc 2 CX as well, and c = (cc)c. The latter fact licenses a dual interpretation
of choice functions as representations of a discriminating behaviour resulting
either in selection or in rejection of the outcomes included in a choice set: in
the ensuing analysis, we shall allow and exploit such a dual view of choice
functions. Nevertheless, when it comes to informal description, I shall indulge
sometimes for the sake of convenience in the common interpretation of chosen
4(unchosen) outcomes as selected (rejected) outcomes.
For any binary relation R ￿ X ￿ X, Ra and Rs denote the asymmetric
and symmetric components of R, respectively, R￿1denotes the inverse of R
(namely (x;y) 2 R￿1 i⁄ (y;x) 2 R), while ￿R ￿ X ￿ X denotes the binary
relation de￿ned by the following rule: x￿Ry i⁄ not yRx (or equivalently
not xR￿1y). Moreover, an 8-type ￿xed point of R in P(X) is a set Y =
fx 2 X : xRy for all y 2 Y g, and F8(X;R) denotes the set of all 8-type ￿xed
points of R in P(X).
Let ￿ ￿ X ￿ X be an irre￿exive binary relation on X i.e. such that
not x￿x for all x 2 X, denoting a suitably de￿ned dominance relation:
(X;￿) is the corresponding dominance digraph (in graph-theoretic parlance,
(X;￿) is in particular a simple, loopless digraph i.e. a directed graph with
at most one arc between any ordered pair of vertices, and with no arc from a
vertex to itself). Observe that, by de￿nition, (X;￿) is a dominance digraph
i⁄ both its inverse (X;￿￿1) and its symmetric closure (X;￿ [ ￿￿1) are
also dominance digraphs. In particular, (X;￿) is an asymmetric dominance
digraph if ￿ = ￿a i.e. x￿y entails not y￿x, for any x;y 2 X. Similarly, a
digraph (X;￿) is re￿exive (respectively, total) if ￿ is re￿ exive i.e. x￿x for
all x 2 X (respectively, total i.e. x￿y or y￿x for any x;y 2 X).
For any Y ￿ X, ￿Y = ￿ \ (Y ￿ Y ) denotes the dominance relation in-
duced by ￿ on Y (of course ￿X = ￿), and (Y;￿Y) is the induced dominance
subdigraph on Y . A VNM-stable set of (Y;￿Y) is a set S ￿ Y that satis￿es
both internal stability (i.e. not x￿Yy for any x;y 2 S) and external stability
(i.e. for any y 2 Y n S there exists x 2 S such that x￿Yy). The set of
all VNM-stable sets of (Y;￿Y) is denoted S(Y;￿Y). A dominance digraph
(X;￿) is said to be VNM-perfect if S(Y;￿Y) 6= ? for any Y ￿ X. The core
of (Y;￿Y), denoted C(Y;￿Y), is the set of all y 2 Y such that not z￿y for
each z 2 Y .
Remark 1 It should be emphasized here that only irre￿exive digraphs admit
a natural representation as dominance relations of an underlying game in
coalitional or strategic form, hence the suggested de￿nition of domination
digraphs. Moreover, any dominance digraph as de￿ned here may arise in a
natural way from an underlying game in coalitional form and from a related
game in strategic form (see the Appendix for the relevant details).
The (asymmetric) basic revealed dominance digraph (X;￿(c)) of a choice
function c 2 CX is de￿ned by the following rule: for any x;y 2 X, x￿(c)y
5if and only if x 6= y and c(fx;yg) = fxg. Similarly, the revealed dominance
digraph (X;￿￿(c)) of a choice function c 2 CX is de￿ned as follows: for any
x;y 2 X, x￿￿(c)y if and only if there exists A ￿ X such that x 2 c(A) and
y = 2 c(A). Clearly enough, ￿(c) is asymmetric hence in particular irre￿exive
by de￿nition, ￿￿(c) is irre￿exive, and ￿(c) ￿ ￿￿(c).
We shall also make some use of three related digraphs attached to a
choice function c 2 CX, namely the basic revealed digraph (X;Rc)) of c, the
extended revealed digraph (X;R(c)) of c, and the revealed choice-conjugation
digraph (X; b R(c)) of c, de￿ned as follows: for any x;y 2 X, xRcy if and only
if x 2 c(fx;yg), xR(c)y if and only if there exists S ￿ X such that x 2 c(S)
and y 2 S, xb R(c)y if and only if there exists S ￿ X such that fx;yg ￿ c(S).
A choice function c 2 CX is a revealed VNM-solution (or VNMS-rationalizable)
if there exists an irre￿exive relation ￿ ￿ X ￿X such that for any nonempty
Y ￿ X, c(Y ) 2 S(Y;￿Y) if S(Y;￿Y) 6= ? and c(Y ) = ? if S(Y;￿Y) = ?
(observe that in particular c(?) = ? and S(?;￿?) = f?g whence c(?) 2
S(?;￿?) anyway, and that -by external stability- for any nonempty A ￿ X if
B 2 S(A;￿A) then B 6= ?). Then, we also say that c is VNMS-rationalizable
by dominance digraph (X;￿). Moreover, c 2 CX is said to be a ￿xed point
solution of 8-type for (X;R) -where R ￿ X ￿ X- if c(A) 2 F8(Y;RY) for
any Y ￿ X (and a ￿xed point solution of 8-type if there exists an R such
that c is a ￿xed point solution of 8-type for (X;R)). Let us take notice from
the outset of an elementary equivalence between revealed VNM-solutions and
￿xed point solutions of 8-type, namely
Claim 2 A choice function c 2 CX is a revealed VNM-solution i⁄ there
exists a re￿ exive R ￿ X ￿ X such that c is a ￿xed point solution of 8-type
for (X;R).
Proof. Just consider R = R￿, and ￿ = ￿R, respectively.
Now, consider the following list of examples:
Example 3 Notice that the digraph (X;?) is also a dominance digraph and
S(A;?A) = fAg for any A ￿ X. Therefore, the identity operator cidX :
P(X) ! P(X) is a revealed VNM-solution.
Example 4 Similarly, the complete digraph (X;(X ￿ X)￿diag)) where X ￿
X￿diag = (X ￿ X) r f(x;x) : x 2 Xg is of course a dominance digraph and
6S(A;(X￿X)
￿diag
A ) = ffxg : x 2 Ag for any A ￿ X. Thus, any single-valued
c 2 CX is a revealed VNM-solution.
Example 5 Take ? ￿ G ￿ X and consider the dichotomic choice function
cG : P(X) ! P(X) as de￿ned by the satis￿cing rule cG(A) = A \ G for
any A ￿ X. It is easily checked that cG is not a revealed VNM-solution:
to see why, take any x 2 X n G. Then, cG(fxg) = ? while for any domi-
nance digraph (X;￿) and any x 2 X, it cannot be the case that x￿x hence
S(fxg;￿fxg) = ffxgg.
Example 6 Take X = fx;y;zg, ￿ = f(x;y);(y;x);(x;z);(z;x)g and c 2
CX such that c(fxg) = fxg, c(fyg) = fyg, c(fzg) = fzg, c(fx;yg) =
c(fx;zg) = fxg, and c(fy;zg) = c(fx;y;zg) = fy;zg. It is easily checked
that S(X;￿) = ffxg;fy;zgg, S(fx;yg;￿fx;yg) = ffxg;fygg,
S(fx;zg;￿fx;zg) = ffxg;fzgg;S(fy;zg;￿fy;zg) = ffy;zgg, and that
c is proper by construction, and VNMS-rationalizable by (X;￿), an irre￿ ex-
ive but not asymmetric dominance digraph: in fact, ￿a = ?. Moreover,
￿(c) = f(x;y);(x;z)g, ￿￿(c) = ￿. Of course, ￿(c) is asymmetric and in
particular ￿(c) = (￿￿(c))a, but S(X;￿(c)) = ffxgg hence c is not VNMS-
rationalizable by (X;￿(c)). Indeed, c is a VNMS-rationalizable choice func-
tion that is covered by Wilson￿ s result but not captured by Suzumura￿ s charac-
terization as mentioned in the Introduction. Notice, however, that by positing
xR￿￿(c)y i⁄ (y;x) = 2 (￿￿(c))a for any x;y 2 X, and denoting maxR
￿￿(c)
Y the
set of R￿￿(c)-maxima of Y for any Y ￿ X, it follows that c(Y ) = maxR
￿￿(c)
Y
for all Y ￿ X.
Example 7 Consider X = fx;y;zg;x 6= y 6= z 6= x, and de￿ne c1 2
CX as follows: c1(fxg) = c1(fx;yg) = fxg, c1(fyg) = c1(fy;zg) = fyg,
c1(fzg) = c1(fx;zg) = fzg, and c1(fx;y;zg) = ?. It is easily checked that c1
is VNMS-rationalizable by the asymmetric dominance digraph (X;￿), where
￿ = f(x;y);(y;z);(z;x)g. Clearly, however, c1 is not proper hence is not
covered by Wilson￿ s more general result (see the Introduction).
The main objective of this article is precisely to provide a characterization
of all revealed VNM-solutions both in C￿
X and in CX.
73 Properties of choice functions
The following two properties of a choice function c 2 CX play a prominent
role under various labels in the extant literature:
Properness (PR): c(A) 6= ? for any nonempty A ￿ X:
Cherno⁄ contraction-consistency (C): for any A;B ￿ X such that A ￿ B,
c(B) \ A ￿ c(A):
Of course, PR amounts to the nonempty-valuedness requirement men-
tioned previously, and is a minimal condition of universal resoluteness on
choice behaviour.
Condition C dictates that any outcome chosen out of a certain set should
also be chosen out of any subset of the former: essentially, it says that any
good reason to choose a certain option out of a given menu should retain its
strenght in every submenu of the former containing that option.
Since the co-choice (or rejection) function attached to a choice function
is also a choice function each property admits its counterpart as obtained
by interchanging the roles of ￿ choice sets￿and ￿ rejection sets￿(it goes with-
out saying that a contraction-consistency property concerning rejection sets
amounts to an expansion-consistency requirement on choice sets, and con-
versely). Hence, in particular, we have:
Co- Cherno⁄ contraction-consistency (CC): for any A;B ￿ X such that
A ￿ B, cc(B) \ A ￿ cc(A):
Thus, condition CC is a context-independency property requiring in turn
that any good reason to reject a certain option out of a given menu retain
its strenght in any submenu of the former containing that option. Notice
that this amounts to set-inclusion monotonicity of c (while conversely C
amounts to set-inclusion monotonicity of c). This basic fact and the resulting
bijection between choice functions satisfying C and set-inclusion monotonic
choice functions is indeed duly exploited by Echenique (2007) in order to
evaluate the number of choice functions satisfying C.
Remark 8 It is easily checked that a VNMS-rationalizable choice function
may well violate PR, C and CC. To see this, consider X = fx;y;z;wg with
#X = 4, ￿ = f(x;y);(y;z);(z;x);(w;x)g, A = fx;zg;A0 = fx;y;zg ,
8B = X = fx;y;z;wg, and c0 2 CX such that for any nonempty Y ￿ X,
c0(Y ) 2 S(Y;￿Y) if S(Y;￿Y) 6= ? and c0(Y ) = ? if S(Y;￿Y) = ? (thus, by
de￿nition, c0 is VNMS-rationalizable). Now, c0(A0) = ? because S(A0;￿A0) =
? (hence PR fails). Moreover, c0(fx;y;z;wg) = fx;wg (since S(X;￿) =
fx;wg), hence c0(fx;y;z;wg)\fx;zg = fxg while c0(fx;zg) = fzg, and C is
violated. Furthermore, take A = fx;zg: then c0c(fx;y;z;wg) = fy;zg, hence
z 2 c0c(fx;y;z;wg) \ fx;zg: however, c(fx;zg) = fzg i.e. z = 2 c0c(fx;zg)
and CC is also violated.
As explained in the previous Remark, VNMS-rationalizable choice func-
tions need not satisfy PR, C, or CC. Let us then consider some considerably
weakened versions of the foregoing properties, namely
No-dummy property (ND): c(fxg) = fxg for any x 2 X:
2- Properness (2-PR): c(A) 6= ? for any A ￿ X such that #A = 2:
Idempotence (IDP): c(c(A)) = c(A) for any A ￿ X:
Binary non-discrimination of jointly chosen outcomes (BNC): for any
A ￿ X and x;y 2 A, if fx;yg ￿ c(A) then either c(fx;yg) = fx;yg or
c(fx;yg) = ?:
Weak binary co- Cherno⁄ contraction-consistency (WBCC): for any B ￿
X such that c(B) 6= ?, and any y 2 cc(B) there exists z 2 c(B) such that
y 2 cc(fy;zg) whenever z 2 c(fy;zg).
Clearly, ND and 2-PR are simply restricted versions of PR.
On the other hand, IDP, BNC and WBCC are context-independence
requirements for choice sets.
Indeed, IDP -sometimes also referred to as ￿ Stability￿ - is a basic self-
consistency requirement of the contraction-consistency family that is easily
shown to be implied by C.
BNC requires that any two chosen outcomes be treated in a symmetric
way when compared to each other in a binary contest. Thus, it is a kind of
contraction-consistency property for selected outcomes, and it can be shown
that it is indeed also implied by C.
WBCC is by construction a restricted version of CC, dictating that any
good reason to reject a certain option out of a given not totally rejected menu
9should retain its strenght in certain binary submenus of the former containing
that option and sharing a chosen option with it.
In other terms, WBCC is a contraction-consistency requirements for rejec-
tion sets, hence, as observed above, it may also be construed as an expansion-
consistency property for choice sets. Thus, in particular, it is worth asking
what is the relationship of WBCC to the most widely used choice expansion-
consistency properties such as Superset consistency, Concordance (also known
as Generalized Condorcet expansion-consistency, or ￿), Regular Expansion-
consistency (or ￿), and Strong Expansion-consistency (or ￿+) (see e.g. Sen
(1971, 1977), Suzumura (1983)), namely
Superset consistency (SS): for any A;B ￿ X , if A ￿ B and ? 6= c(B) ￿
c(A) then c(A) ￿ c(B).
Concordance (CO): for any A;B ￿ X , c(A) \ c(B) ￿ c(A [ B).
Regular expansion-consistency (RE): for any A;B ￿ X , if A ￿ B and
c(B) \ c(A) 6= ? then c(A) ￿ c(B).
Strong expansion-consistency (SE): for any A;B ￿ X , if A ￿ B and
c(B) \ A 6= ? then c(A) ￿ c(B).
It turns out that WBCC is implied by RE (but not conversely), and is
independent of CO and SS (observe that CC implies SE which implies RE
which in turn implies SS, by de￿nition). Some of the salient relationships
among PR, C, CC, SS, CO, RE, SE, ND, 2-PR, IDP, BNC, and WBCC
as alluded to above (and not necessarily mutually independent) are made
precise by the following
Proposition 9 Let c 2 CX . Then,
(i) if c satis￿es PR then it also satis￿es ND, 2-PR (while the converse
need not hold);
(ii) if c satis￿es C then it also satis￿es IDP (while the converse need not
hold);
(iii) if c satis￿es C then it also satis￿es BNC (while the converse need
not hold );
(iv) if c satis￿es RE then it also satis￿es WBCC;
(v) even under PR, properties BNC and IDP are mutually independent;
10(vi) WBCCA is independent of properties CO and SS (even under PR);
(viii) if c satis￿es ND, 2-PR, BNC, and WBCC then it also satis￿es SS,
but need not satisfy C, CO, or RE;
(ix) if c satis￿es PR, C, CO, and SS then it also satis￿es WBCC.
Proof. (i) That PR implies ND and 2-PR but not conversely is trivial since
by hypothesis #X > 3.
(ii) Just take A = c(B). To check that the converse does not hold, see
the example provided below under point (iii) of this proof;
(iii) Let c satisfy C, A ￿ X , x;y 2 A, and fx;yg ￿ c(A). Then,
by C, c(A) \ fx;yg ￿ c(fx;yg) hence fx;yg ￿ c(fx;yg) i.e. c(fx;yg) =
fx;yg and BNC holds. However, take the choice function introduced in the
previous Remark i.e. consider X = fx;y;z;wg;#X = 4, and c0 2 CX such
that c0(fx;yg) = c0(fxg) = fxg, c0(fy;zg) = c0(fyg) = fyg, c0(fx;zg) =
c0(fzg) = fzg, c0(fz;wg) = c0(fwg) = fwg, c0(fx;wg) = c0(fx;y;wg) =
c0(fx;z;wg) = fx;wg, c0(fy;wg) = c0(fy;z;wg) = fy;wg, c0(fx;y;zg) = ?,
and c0(fx;y;z;wg) = fx;wg. Clearly, BNC is satis￿ed by c0, by construction.
However, c0(fx;y;z;wg) \ fx;zg = fxg while c0(fx;zg) = fzg hence C is
violated;
(iv) Let us assume that c satis￿es RE but not WBCC. Then, by de￿nition
of WBCC, there exist B ￿ X and x 2 B s.t. x = 2 c(B) 6= ? and c(fx;yg) =
fx;yg for any y 2 c(B). It follows that, by RE, c(fx;yg) ￿ c(B), whence
x 2 c(B), a contradiction.
(v) To check that the conjunction of PR and BNC does not imply IDP,
consider X = fx;w;y;zg, #X = 4, and take c 2 CX de￿ned as follows:
c(A) = A for any A ￿ X, A = 2 fX;fx;y;zgg, c(X) = fx;y;zg, c(fx;y;zg) =
fx;yg. It is immediately checked that c satis￿es both PR and BNC, however
c(c(X)) = fx;yg 6= c(X) i.e. IDP is violated.To check that the conjunction of
PR and IDP does not imply BNC, consider X = fx;y;zg, #X = 3, and take
c 2 CX de￿ned as follows: c(fhg) = fhg for any h 2 X, c(X) = fx;y;zg,
c(fx;yg) = fxg, c(fx;zg) = fzg, c(fy;zg) = fyg. Clearly, c satis￿es PR and
IDP, but violates BNC.
(vii) To check that WBCC does not imply CO, consider X = fx;y;z;u;vg,
#X = 5, ￿ = f(x;y);(y;z);(z;u);(u;v);(v;x)g, and take a choice function
c￿ 2 CX which is VNMS-rationalizable by dominance digraph (X;￿) on
any A ￿ X, while c￿(X) = fy;z;u;vg. It is easily checked that c￿does in-
deed satisfy WBCC since c￿(fx;yg) = fxg (and PR as well). On the other
hand, take A = fx;y;zg;B = fx;u;vg: it is immediately checked that
11c￿(A) = fx;zg;c￿(B) = fx;ug; while x 2 c￿(A [ B) hence CO fails. Next,
take X = fx;y;z;u;vg, #X = 5, and consider c￿ 2 CX de￿ned as follows:
c￿(fhg) = fhg for any h 2 X,
c￿(fx;yg) = c￿(fx;y;ug) = c￿(fx;y;u;vg)) = c￿(fx;ug) = c￿(fx;u;vg) =
fxg,
c￿(fx;vg) = c￿(fx;y;vg) = fx;vg,
c￿(fx;zg) = c￿(fx;z;ug) = c￿(fx;z;u;vg)) = fzg,
c￿(fx;y;zg) = c￿(fx;y;z;ug) = c￿(fx;y;z;u;vg) = fx;y;zg,
c￿(fy;zg) = fyg,
c￿(fy;z;ug) = fy;ug,
c￿(fy;vg) = c￿(fy;z;vg) = fy;vg,
c￿(fy;ug) = c￿(fy;u;vg) = c￿(fy;z;u;vg) = fy;ug,
c￿(fz;ug) = c￿(fz;u;vg) = fz;ug,
c￿(fz;vg) = c￿(fx;z;vg) = fz;vg,
c￿(fu;vg) = fug,
c￿(fx;y;z;vg) = fx;y;z;vg.
It can be checked that c￿ satis￿es CO (and PR), but fails to satisfy
WBCC: indeed, v = 2 c￿(fx;y;z;u;vg) = fx;y;zg. However, c￿(fx;vg) =
fx;vg, c￿(fy;vg) = fy;v)g, and c￿(fz;vg) = fz;vg.
To see that WBCC does not entail SS, take X = fx;y;z;wg and consider
c00 2 CX de￿ned as follows: c00(fx;y)g = fxg, c00(fz;wg) = fwg, c00(X) =
fx;zg, and c00(A) = A for any other A ￿ X. It is easily checked, that by
construction WBCC is satis￿ed (and PR as well). However, e.g. fx;yg =
c00(X) ￿ c00(fx;y;zg). To check that SS does not entail WBCC, take X =
fx;y;zg and c000 2 CX de￿ned as follows: c00(A) = A for any A ￿ X, and
c000(X) = fx;yg. Clearly, by construction SS is satis￿ed (and PR as well),
but WBCC is violated.
(viii) Let c satisfy 2-PR, BNC and WBCC. Then, suppose SS is violated.
Thus, there exist A;B ￿ X and x 2 A such that A ￿ B; ? 6= c(B) ￿ c(A)
and x 2 c(A) n c(B). It follows, by WBCC and 2-PR, that there exists
y 2 c(B) such that ? 6= c(fx;yg) 6= fx;yg. Assume that y = 2 c(fx;y)g.
Then, c(fx;y)g = fxg. Otherwise, c(fx;y)g = fyg. In any case, by BNC, it
follows that there exists no A ￿ X such that fx;yg ￿ c(A), a contradiction
since y 2 c(B) ￿ c(A).
On the other hand, consider again X = fx;y;z;u;vg, #X = 5, ￿ =
f(x;y);(y;z);(z;u);(u;v);(v;x)g, and take any choice function c￿￿ 2 CX
which is VNMS-rationalizable by dominance digraph (X;￿). Finally, con-
sider again c0 as de￿ned above under point (iii) of this proof. It can be
12readily checked that both of them satisfy WBCC, BNC, ND and 2-CPR.
However, c￿￿ violates CO (for the very same reason its variant c￿ as de￿ned
under point (iii) does), while c0 fails to satisfy C (as observed above) and RE
(because, recall, c0(fy;wg) = fy;wg, while c0(fx;y;z;wg) = fx;wg, hence
c0(fy;wg) \ c0(fx;y;z;wg) 6= ?, but c0(fy;wg) * c0(fx;y;z;wg)).
(ix) Let c satisfy PR,C, CO and SS. Then, by a well-known result (see
e.g. Theorem 2.6 in Suzumura (1983)) there exists a binary relation R with a
transitive asymmetric component such that c(A) = maxRA for any A ￿ X;
moreover, R = Rc which is de￿ned as follows: for any y;z 2 X, yRcz i⁄
there exists Y ￿ X such that y 2 c(Y ) and z 2 Y . Let us now assume that
WBCC is not satis￿ed by c. Then, there exists B ￿ X and x 2 B such that
c(B) 6= ?, x = 2 c(B), while c(fx;zg) = fx;zg for each z 2 c(B). It follows
that xRz for all z 2 c(B) hence, by de￿nition of R, x 2 c(c(B)). However, by
C, c also satis￿es IDP (see point (ii) of this claim) whence c(c(B)) = c(B).
But then, x 2 c(B), a contradiction.
Remark 10 It is easily checked that any VNMS-rationalizable choice func-
tion does indeed satisfy IDP. To see this, take any A ￿ X, and x 2 c(A) 2
S(A;￿A) (for some dominance digraph (X;￿)). Clearly, not x￿Ay for
any y 2 c(A), hence by de￿nition S(A;￿A) = fc(A)g. It follows that
S(c(A);￿c(A)) = fc(A)g as well, whence c(c(A)) = c(A). The proof that
VNMS-rationalizable choice functions satisfy ND, 2-PR, BNC, and WBCC
(hence SS as well) will be provided below (as a part of the proof of Theorem
13 below).
It is also worth noticing here that any choice function c that is VNMS-
rationalizable by an asymmetric dominance digraph (X;￿) does also satisfy
a weaker asymmetric version of CO, namely
Asymmetric Generalized Condorcet expansion-consistency (AGC): for
any A ￿ X , and any x 2 A, if c(fx;yg) = fxg for all y 2 A, then
c(A) = fxg:
Indeed, if c is VNMS-rationalizable by an asymmetric dominance digraph
(X;￿), then for any A ￿ X, x 2 A, if for all y 2 A, c(fx;yg) = fxg then
S(fx;yg;￿fx;yg) = ffxgg for all y 2 A. Therefore, by external stability of
VNM-stable sets, x￿y (whence not y￿x, by asymmetry) for any y 2 A. Now,
let (X;￿0) be any dominance digraph such that c is VNMS-rationalizable
by (X;￿0). By construction, ￿0
A = ￿A, hence S(A;￿0
A) = S(A;￿A) =
ffxgg(because it is easily checked that by construction fxg 2 S(A;￿A),
13and that any VNM-stable set of (A;￿A) must contain x by external sta-
bility whence by internal stability must also exclude every y 2 A n fxg). It
follows that c(A) = fxg as required, and AGC is satis￿ed.
To see that the asymmetry requirement on (X;￿) cannot be dispensed
with, just take X = fx;y;zg, ￿ = f(x;y);(y;x);(x;z);(z;x)g and c 2 CX
such that c(fxg) = fxg, c(fyg) = fyg, c(fzg) = fzg, c(fx;yg) = fxg,
c(fx;zg) = fxg, and c(fy;zg) = c(fx;y;zg) = fy;zg. In fact, it is easily
checked that S(X;￿) = ffxg;fy;zgg and that c is VNMS-rationalizable by
(X;￿), while clearly violating AGC.
4 Characterizing revealed VNM-solutions
Let us now proceed to characterizations of VNMS-rationalizable choice
functions by means of suitable combinations of some the properties discussed
in the previous section.
To begin with, it is worth emphasizing that a certain dominance digraph
may provide a VNMS-rationalization of several distinct choice functions and,
perhaps less obviously, a choice function may be VNM-rationalizable by sev-
eral distinct dominance digraphs. Those simple facts about revealed VNM-
solutions are illustrated by the following
Example 11 Consider X = fx;y;zg and dominance digraph (X;￿) with
￿ = f(x;y);(y;z);(z;x);(x;zg), and choice functions c;c0 2 X de￿ned as
follows: c(fug) = c0(fug) = fug for any u 2 X, c(fx;yg) = c0(fx;yg) = fxg,
c(fy;zg) = c0(fy;zg) = fyg, c(X) = c0(X) = fxg, but c(fx;zg) = fxg
while c0(fx;zg) = fzg. Clearly, both c and c0 are VNMS-rationalizable by
(X;￿). Conversely, take again X = fx;y;zg and c00 2 CX de￿ned as follows:
c(fug) = c0(fug) = fug for any u 2 X, c(fx;yg) = c0(fx;yg) = fxg,
c(fy;zg) = fyg, c(fx;zg) = fxg , and c(X) = fxg. Now consider ￿ =
f(x;y);(x;z);(y;z)g and, say, ￿0 = f(x;y);(x;z);(y;z);(z;y)g. Clearly c is
VNMS-rationalizable by both (X;￿) and (X;￿0).
In order to proceed towards our characterizations, let us now introduce a
new piece of notation, and prove a pair of simple and useful lemmas, namely
14Notation 12 Let R ￿ R0 ￿ X ￿ X. Then R0 is a local symmetric closure
of R - written R0 2 cls(R) - i⁄ [for any x;y 2 X, (x;y) 2 R0 r R entails
(y;x) 2 R].
Lemma 13 Let c 2 CX . Then, (i) c satis￿es 2-PR and is VNMS-rationalizable
by dominance digraph (X;￿) only if ￿Rc ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿Rc [ (￿Rc)￿1 and ￿ 2
cls(￿Rc); (ii) if c satis￿es 2-PR and BNC, then ￿Rc [ (￿Rc)￿1 = ￿
b R(c),
and for any Z ￿ Y ￿ X, Z 2 S(Y;￿
b R(c)
Y ) whenever [Z 2 S(Y;￿
Rc
Y )
or Z 2 S(Y;(￿Rc)
￿1
Y )]; (iii) if c satis￿es 2-PR, is VNMS-rationalizable by
(X;￿) and (X;￿00), and ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿00 then c is also VNMS-rationalizable
by (X;￿0).
Proof. (i) Let c be VNMS-rationalizable by dominance digraph (X;￿).
Then, for any x 2 X, c(fxg) 2 S(fxg;￿fxg) = ffxgg, i.e. c(fxg) = fxg
hence c satis￿es ND and by de￿nition both (x;x) = 2 ￿Rc and (x;x) = 2
(￿Rc)￿1. Now, let x;y 2 X: of course there are four possible cases to
consider, namely a) x￿y and y￿x, whence S(fx;yg;￿fx;yg) = ffxg;fygg;
b) x￿y and not y￿x, whence S(fx;yg;￿fx;yg) = ffxgg, c) y￿x and not
x￿y, whence S(fx;yg;￿fx;yg) = ffygg; d) not x￿y and not y￿x whence
S(fx;yg;￿fx;yg) = ffx;ygg. Under a), either c(fx;yg) = fxg or c(fx;yg) =
fyg (but not both of them) hence by de￿nition either (x￿Rcy and not y￿Rcx)
or (y￿Rcx and not x￿Rcy); under b), c(fx;yg) = fxg hence x￿Rcy and not
y￿Rcx; under c), c(fx;yg) = fyg hence y￿Rcx and not x￿Rcy; under d),
c(fx;yg) = fx;yg hence not x￿Rcy and not y￿Rcx. Thus, in any case x￿y
entails either x￿Rcy or x(￿Rc)￿1y i.e. ￿ ￿ ￿Rc [ (￿Rc)￿1. Next, suppose
that ￿Rc * ￿ i.e. there exist x;y 2 X such that x￿Rcy and not x￿y.
Thus, not yRcx i.e. by 2-PR c(fx;yg) = fxg 2 S(fx;yg;￿fx;yg), while
as it is easily checked not x￿y entails S(fx;yg;￿fx;yg) ￿ ffyg;fx;ygg, a
contradiction: it follows that ￿Rc ￿ ￿.
Moreover, let x￿y and not y￿Rcx. Then fxg 2 S(fx;yg;￿fx;yg), and
(x;y) = 2 ￿Rc i.e. by de￿nition y 2 c(fx;yg). Clearly, fx;yg is not internally
stable in (fx;yg;￿fx;yg) since fxg 2 S(fx;yg;￿fx;yg) and is therefore an
externally stable set. Thus, fx;yg = 2 S(fx;yg;￿fx;yg): as a consequence,
y 2 c(fx;yg) 2 S(fx;yg;￿fx;yg) entails that fyg 2 S(fx;yg;￿fx;yg) as well,
whence c(fx;yg) = fyg and y￿x. It follows that, by de￿nition, ￿ 2 cl
s(￿Rc).
(ii) Let c satisfy ND, 2-PR and BNC, and suppose (x;y) 2 ￿Rc [(￿Rc)￿1
i.e. not yRcx or not xRcy.
15If not yRcx then c(fx;yg) 6= fx;yg hence by BNC there is no Y ￿ X
such that fx;yg ￿ c(Y ) and therefore not xb R(c)y and not y b R(c)x. Thus,
by de￿nition, x￿
b R(c)y and y￿
b R(c)x. By the very same argument, if not xRcy
then x￿
b R(c)y and y￿
b R(c)x.
Conversely, suppose that x￿
b R(c)y i.e. by ND x 6= y and there is no Y ￿ X
such that fx;yg ￿ c(Y ). Then in particular c(fx;yg) 6= fx;yg hence by 2-
PR c(fx;yg) = fxg or c(fx;yg) = fyg. If c(fx;yg) = fxg then not yRcx i.e.
x￿Rcy, and similarly if c(fx;yg) = fyg then not xRcy i.e. y￿Rcc, namely
x(￿Rc [ (￿Rc)￿1)y.
Moreover, let Z 2 S(Y;￿
Rc
Y ) [ S(Y;(￿Rc)
￿1
Y ). Then, in any case, by





for any x;y 2 Z. Also, by external stability, for any y 2 Y r Z there exists
z 2 Z such that z￿Rcy or z(￿Rc)￿1y i.e. z(￿Rc [(￿Rc)￿1)y. It follows that




Y i.e. by the previous argument Z 2 S(Y;￿
b Rc
Y );
(iii) Let us now suppose that c is VNMS-rationalizable by (X;￿) and
(X;￿00), and ￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿00: notice that, by point (i) of this Lemma, ￿Rc ￿ ￿
and ￿00 ￿ ￿Rc [ (￿Rc)￿1. Then, for any Y ￿ X such that c(Y ) 6= ?,
c(Y ) 2 S(Y;￿Y)\S(Y;￿00
Y). Hence, in particular not x￿00y and therefore by
hypothesis not x￿0y for any x;y 2 c(Y ). On the other hand, for any y 2 Y r
Z there exists in particular z 2 c(Y ) such that z￿y hence by hypothesis z￿0y.
It follows that c(Y ) 2 S(Y;￿0
Y) as well. Moreover, let Y ￿ X be nonempty
and such that c(Y ) = ?. Then, by hypothesis, S(Y;￿Y) = S(Y;￿00
Y) = ?.
Suppose however that S(Y;￿0
Y) 6= ? and let S 2 S(Y;￿0
Y). By internal
stability, not x￿0y for any x;y 2 S hence by de￿nition not x￿Rcy -and not
y￿Rcx- and therefore not x￿00y. Moreover, for any y 2 Y r S there exists
z 2 S such that z￿0y, hence z￿00y as well, i.e. S 2 S(Y;￿00
Y), a contradiction.
It follows that S(Y;￿0
Y) = ? and c is also VNMS-rationalizable by (X;￿0).
Lemma 14 Let c 2 CX satisfy ND, 2-PR, BNC and WBCC. Then, for any
Y ￿ X, if c(Y ) 6= ? then S(Y;￿
b R(c)
Y ) 6= ? and c(Y ) 2 S(Y;￿
b R(c)
Y ).
Proof. Let Y ￿ X and c(Y ) 6= ?: then, by BNC, for any x;y 2 c(Y )
either c(fx;yg) = fx;yg or c(fx;yg) = ?. Hence c(fx;yg) = fx;yg by ND
and 2-PR. Therefore, xb R(c)y and y b R(c)x i.e. by de￿nition of ￿
b R(c), not
y￿
b R(c)x and not x￿
b R(c)y hence c(Y ) is an internally stable set of (Y;￿
b R(c)
Y ).
Moreover, let z 2 Y nc(Y ): then, by WBCC, there exists x 2 c(Y ) such that
16z 2 cc(Y ) \ fx;zg ￿ cc(fx;zg) unless x = 2 c(fx;zg). Now, if x = 2 c(fx;zg)
then by 2-PR c(fx;zg) = fzg, otherwise c(fx;zg) = fxg whence in any case
by BNC there is no A ￿ X such that fx;zg ￿ c(A) i.e. not xb R(c)z and
not z b R(c)x. It follows that, by de￿nition, z￿
b R(c)y (and y￿
b R(c)z), hence in




The foregoing lemmas motivate the introduction of a new notion, namely
De￿nition 15 The Von Neumann-Morgenstern basis BV NM(c) of the proper
subdomain of c 2 CX is the set of set-inclusion minimal dominance digraphs
(X;￿i)i2I such that c(B) 2 S(B;￿i
B) for any B ￿ X with c(B) 6= ?.
Such a notion of Von Neumann-Morgenstern basis of a choice function in
turn enables the introduction of the following ￿ boundary￿property concerning
the behaviour of a choice function c 2 CX on its (possibly empty) improper
subdomain.
Revealed VNM-Failure (RVNMF): For any nonempty A ￿ X, if c(A) = ?
then there exists a ￿ 2 BV NM(c) such that S(A;￿A) = ?.
Clearly enough, RVNMF rules out the existence of VNM-stable sets of
some revealed dominance digraphs whenever the choice set of a nonempty
set is empty, as aptly illustrated by the following example.
Example 16 Take X = fx;y;z;wg, and consider c;c0;c00 2 CX de￿ned
as follows: for any u 2 X, c(fug) = fug, c(fx;yg) = fxg, c(fy;zg) =
fyg, c(fx;zg) = fzg, c(Y ) = fwg for any Y ￿ X such that w 2 Y
and #Y ￿ 3 , c(fx;y;zg) = c(X) = ?, while c0(Y ) = c(Y ) for any
Y ￿ X and c0(X) = fwg, and c00(Y ) = c0(Y ) for any Y ￿ X such that
Y 6= fx;y;zg, and c00(fx;y;zg) = fxg. It can be easily checked that c0 is a
VNM-solution of dominance digraph (X;￿Rc0): notice that ￿Rc0 = ￿Rc =





fx;y;zg) = ? it follows
that c violates RVNMF while c0 satis￿es it. On the other hand, c00 is nonempty-
valued and therefore trivially satis￿es RVNMF.
17Admittedly, RVNMF smacks of ad-hoc-ness in that it dictates an explicit
connection between choice sets and VNM-stable sets of certain digraphs.
However, unpacking that condition in a more transparent manner seems to
be hardly a trivial task. Arguably, that apparent di¢ culty might re￿ ect the
fact that the characterization of digraphs admitting a VNM-stable set (or,
dually, a kernel) is still an open problem, and a resilient one at that.
Be it as it may, we are now ready to prove the main results of this paper.
Let us then start from the class of nonempty-valued revealed VNM-solutions.
Theorem 17 Let c 2 CX. Then, c satis￿es PR, BNC and WBCC i⁄ there
exists a VNM-perfect dominance digraph (X;￿) such that c(Y ) 2 S(Y;￿Y)
for any Y ￿ X. Moreover, ￿a = ￿(c) hence in particular ￿ = ￿(c) if
(X;￿) is an asymmetric dominance digraph.
Proof. Let c 2 CX satisfy PR, BNC and WBCC. Since PR obviously entails
ND and 2-PR, the previous Lemma applies. It follows that, for any Y ￿ X,
S(Y;￿
b R(c)
Y ) 6= ? and c(Y ) 2 S(Y;￿
b R(c)
Y ) .
Conversely, suppose that there exists a VNM-perfect dominance digraph
(X;￿) such that c(Y ) 2 S(Y;￿Y) for any Y ￿ X. Since (X;￿) is VNM-
perfect, S(Y;￿Y) 6= ? for any Y ￿ X. Since by external stability a VNM-
stable set of a nonempty set is nonempty, c(Y ) 6= ? for any nonempty Y ￿ X,
i.e. c satis￿es PR.
Also, for any A ￿ X and x;y 2 A, if fx;yg ￿ c(A) 2 S(Y;￿Y) then
neither x￿Yy nor y￿Yx whence by de￿nition not x￿y and not y￿x. It
follows that S(fx;yg;￿fx;yg) = fx;yg hence c(fx;yg) = fx;yg and therefore
c does satisfy BNC.
Furthermore, let B ￿ X. By hypothesis, ? 6= c(B) 2 S(B;￿B). If
c(B) = B i.e. cc(B) = ?, there is nothing to prove concerning WBCC.
Otherwise, take any x 2 cc(B): by external stability of c(B) with respect to
(B;￿B), there exists z 2 B such that z￿y. Therefore, it cannot be the case
that fy;zg ￿ cfy;zg i.e. y 2 cc(fy;zg) whenever z 2 c(fy;zg), and WBCC
is satis￿ed.
Moreover, let (X;￿) be a VNM-perfect asymmetric dominance digraph
such that c(Y ) 2 S(Y;￿Y) for any Y ￿ X. For any x;y 2 X, if x￿(c)y then
by de￿nition x 6= y and c(fx;yg) = fxg. Since by hypothesis c(fx;yg) 2
S(fx;yg;￿fx;yg) it follows that fxg 2 S(fx;yg;￿fx;yg) hence by external
stability x￿fx;ygy, and therefore x￿y. On the other hand, if x￿y and not
18y￿x then S(fx;yg;￿fx;yg) = ffxgg hence by hypothesis c(fx;yg) = fxg;
and x￿(c)y. It follows that ￿a = ￿(c).
Remark 18 The characterization result provided above is tight as shown by
the following examples. First, to check the independence of PR, let us con-
sider without loss of generality X = fx;y;zg;x 6= y 6= z 6= x, and de￿ne
c1 2 CX as follows: c1(fxg) = c1(fx;yg) = fxg, c1(fyg) = c1(fy;zg) = fyg,
c1(fzg) = c1(fx;zg) = fzg, and c1(fx;y;zg) = ?. It is easily checked that,
by construction, c1 satis￿es both BNC and WBCC. However, c1(fx;y;zg) =
? hence c1 does not satisfy PR. Next, take c2 2 CX de￿ned as follows:
c2(fxg) = c2(fx;yg) = fxg, c2(fyg) = c2(fy;zg) = fyg, c2(fzg) = c2(fx;zg) =
fzg, and c2(fx;y;zg) = fx;y;zg. It is immediately checked that c2 sat-
is￿es PR and WBCC, but violates BNC. Furthermore, consider again X =
fx;y;zg and de￿ne c3 2 CX as follows: c3(fxg) = c3(fx;yg) = c3(fx;y;zg) =
fxg, c3(fyg) = c3(fy;zg) = fyg, c3(fzg) = fzg, and c3(fx;zg) = fx;zg. It
is easily checked that c3 satis￿es both PR and BNS, but violates WBCC.
Hence, PR, BNC and WBCC are mutually independent properties.
It should be remarked here that any single-valued choice function does
satisfy PR, BNS and WBCC and is therefore a VNM-solution i.e. C1
X ￿ Cs￿
X .
Let us now turn to the general case, i.e. to the characterization problem
for choice functions in CX that are VNMS-rationalizable by some (possibly
not VNM-perfect) dominance digraph (X;￿). We shall provide here a char-
acterization of all VNMS-rationalizable choice functions (including the very
important subclass of VNMS-rationalizable tournament solutions).
Theorem 19 Let c 2 CX. Then c is VNMS-rationalizable by a dominance
digraph (X;￿) i⁄ it satis￿es ND, 2-PR, BNC, WBCC and RVNMF.
Proof. Let c 2 CX be VNMS-rationalizable, namely, suppose there exists
a dominance digraph (X;￿) such that c(Y ) 2 S(Y;￿Y) for any Y ￿ X if
S(Y;￿Y) 6= ?, and c(Y ) = ? otherwise. Then, take any A ￿ X such that
1 ￿ #A ￿ 2. Clearly, if x;y 2 A then there are four cases to consider:
(i) x￿fx;ygy, (ii) y￿fx;ygx, (iii) ￿fx;yg = ?, (iv) x￿fx;ygy and y￿fx;ygx (in
particular, case (iii) always applies if x = y).
19Then, if x = y we have S(fxg;￿fxg) = ffxgg hence c(fxg) = fxg i.e. c
satis￿es ND.
Moreover, if x 6= y then, respectively, S(fx;yg;￿fx;yg) = ffxgg,
S(fx;yg;￿fx;yg) = ffygg, S(fx;yg;￿fx;yg) = ffx;ygg,
and S(fx;yg;￿fx;yg) = ffxg;fygg.
In any case, it follows that S(fx;yg;￿fx;yg) 6= ? and therefore c(fx;yg) 2
S(fx;yg;￿fx;yg). Now, ? = 2 S(fx;yg;￿fx;yg) by external stability of VNM-
stable sets, hence c(fx;yg) 6= ?, and 2-PR is also satis￿ed.
Next, consider any A ￿ X and x;y 2 A, such that fx;yg ￿ c(A). Then,
by our hypothesis, S(A;￿A) 6= ? and c(A) 2 S(A;￿A). It follows that,
by internal stability of VNM-stable sets, neither x￿Ay nor y￿Ax i.e. in
particular not x￿fx;ygy and not y￿fx;ygx. Thus S(fx;yg;￿fx;yg) = ffx;ygg
whence c(fx;yg) = fx;yg, and BNC is also satis￿ed by c.
Moreover, take any B ￿ X such that c(B) 6= ?. Then, by hypothesis,
c(B) 2 S(B;￿B) hence, by external stability of VNM-stable sets, for any
y 2 cc(B) there exists xy 2 c(B) such that xy￿By i.e. xy￿y. Thus, y 2
cc fxy;yg whenever xy 2 c(fxy;yg), and WBCC is satis￿ed by c.
Finally, let (X;￿) be a dominance digraph such that c is VNMS-rationalizable,
and suppose c fails to satisfy RVNMF. Then, there exists a nonempty A ￿ X
such that such that c(A) = ? and S(A;￿A) 6= ? for any ￿ 2 BV NM(c), a
contradiction since by hypothesis c is VNMS-rationalizable.
Conversely, let c 2 CX satisfy ND, 2-PR, BNS and WBCC, and RVNMF.
Thus Lemma 15 above applies again, and for any B ￿ X, if c(B) 6= ? then
in particular there exists a dominance digraph such that S(B;￿B) 6= ? and
c(B) 2 S(B;￿B), whence c(B) = 2 S(B;￿B) only if c(B) = ?. Moreover,
by RVNMF, for any nonempty A ￿ X such that c(A) = ? there exists a
￿0 2 BV NM(c) such that S(A;￿0
A) = ?. Therefore, by de￿nition of BV NM(c),
c is VNMS-rationalizable by (X;￿0).
Remark 20 Notice that the foregoing characterization is also tight: indeed,
consider again without loss of generality a set X such that #X = 3, and
c4;c5 2 CX as de￿ned below: c4(fxg) = c4(fx;yg) = c4(fx;zg) = fxg,
c4(fyg) = c4(fy;zg) = fyg, c4(fzg) = fzg, and c4(fx;y;zg) = ?; c5(fxg) =
c5(fx;yg) = c5(fx;zg) = fxg, c5(fyg) = c5(fy;zg) = fyg, c5(fzg) = fzg,
and c5(fx;y;zg) = fxg. By construction, both c4 and c5 do satisfy 2-CPR,
BNS and WBCC. However, c4 fails to satisfy RVNMF since for any A ￿ X,
c5(A) 6= ? whenever c4(A) 6= ?, but c4(fx;y;zg) = ? while c5(fx;y;zg) 6=
?.
20Moreover, take any dominance digraph (X;￿) such that there exist three
distinct x;y;z 2 X with ￿fx;y;zg = f(x;y);(y;z)g, and consider c6;c7;c8;c9 2
CX as de￿ned according to the following rules: for any nonempty A ￿ X,
c6(A) 2 S(A;￿A) if S(A;￿A) 6= ? and A 6= fzg, and c6(fzg) = ?
otherwise
c7(A) 2 S(A;￿A) if S(A;￿A) 6= ? and A 6= fy;zg, and c7(A) = ?
otherwise





x 2 A: for any y 2 A there exists a positive integer k
and z1;::;zk 2 A
such that x = z1;::;zk = y;




c9(A) = fx 2 A: for all y 2 A, not y￿Ax g
Finally, posit X = fx;y;zg,
c10(fug) = fug for any u 2 X, c10(fx;yg) = c10(fx;zg) = fxg, c10(fy;zg) =
fyg, c10(X) = ?,
and
c11(Y ) = c10(Y ) for any Y ￿ X, c11(X) = fxg.
Then, it is immediately checked that c6 satis￿es satis￿es 2-PR, BNC and
WBCC, but violates ND, c7satis￿es ND, BNC and WBCC, but violates 2-PR,
c8 satis￿es ND, 2-PR and WBCC but violates BNC, c9 satis￿es ND, 2-PR
and BNC but violates WBCC, c10 satis￿es ND, 2-PR, BNC and WBCC but
violates RVNMF since c10 and c11 are VNMS-homologous with respect to
dominance digraph (X;f(x;y);(x;z);(y;z)g) on P(X)rfXg, and c10(X) =
? 6= c11(X):
5 Posets of revealed VNM-solutions
Let us now turn to a global description of the order-theoretic structure of the
class of all revealed VNM-solutions (of all nonempty-valued revealed VNM-
solutions, respectively).
A partially ordered set or poset is a pair C = (C;6) where C is a set and
6 is a re￿ exive, transitive and antisymmetric binary relation on C (i.e. for
any x 2 C, x 6 x and for any x;y;z 2 C, x 6 z whenever x 6 y and y 6 z,
and x = y whenever x 6 y and y 6 z). A coatom of a poset C = (C;6) with
a top element or maximum 1C is any j 2 C which is covered by 1c- written
21j l1C- i.e. j < 1C and l = j for any l 2 C such that j 6 l < 1C. The set of
all coatoms of C is denoted A￿
C.
A poset C = (C;6) is a meet semilattice (join semilattice, respectively)
if for any x;y 2 C the 6-greatest lower bound x ^ y (the 6-least upper
bound x _ y, respectively) of fx;yg does exist. Moreover, C is a lattice if
it is both a meet semilattice and a join semilattice. A lattice C = (C;6) is
bounded if there exist both a bottom element 0C and a top element 1C (hence
in particular a ￿nite lattice is also bounded), distributive i⁄ x ^ (y _ z) =
(x ^ y) _ (x ^ z) for any x;y;z 2 C, complemented if it is bounded and for
any x 2 C there exists x0 2 C such that x _ x0 = 1C and x ^ x0 = 0C, and
Boolean i⁄ it is both distributive and complemented.
The set CX of all choice functions on X can be endowed in a natural way
with the point-wise set inclusion partial order 6 by positing, for any c;c0 2
CX, c 6 c0 i⁄ c(A) ￿ c0(A) for each A ￿ X. Clearly, the identity operator
cidX is its top element, and the constant empty-valued choice function c;X
its bottom element. It is well-known, and easily checked, that (CX;6) is
in fact a Boolean lattice with _ = [ (i.e. set-union) and ^ = \ (i.e. set-
intersection): see e.g. Monjardet, Raderanirina (2004). The class of choice
functions C￿ =
[
fC￿xy : x;y 2 X;x 6= yg, that will also be used in the
ensuing analysis, is de￿ned as follows: for any x;y 2 X such that x 6= y, and
any c 2 CX, c 2 C￿xy i⁄ for all A ￿ X, c(A) = A r fyg or c(A) = A r fxg
if fx;yg ￿ A, and c(A) = A otherwise.
Now, let Cs




X the set of all nonempty￿ valued VNM-solutions on X:
We also denote by (Cs
X;60) and (Cs￿
X ;600) the corresponding subposets of
(CX;6) (i.e. 60=6 \(Cs
X ￿ Cs
X), and 600=6 \(Cs￿
X ￿ Cs￿
X ), respectively).
It turns out that both (Cs
X;60) and (Cs￿
X ;600) share with (CX;6) their top
element but neither of them is a sub-\-semilattice or a sub-[-semilattice of
(CX;6), namely
Theorem 21 (i) The poset (Cs￿
X ;600) has a maximum, cidX; C￿ as de￿ned
above is the set of its coatoms, and C1
X is the set of its minimal elements.
However, (Cs￿
X ;600) is neither a sub-\-semilattice nor a sub-[-semilattice of
(CX;6); (ii) The poset (Cs
X;60) has a maximum, cidX, and C￿ is the set of
its coatoms. However, (Cs
X;60) is neither a sub-\-semilattice nor a sub-[-
semilattice of (CX;6).
22Proof. (i) First, recall that cidX is VNMS-rationalizable by dominance di-
graph (X;?) hence it is the maximum of (Cs￿
X ;600).
Now, let c 2 C￿ namely there exist x;y 2 X such that c 2 C￿xy as
de￿ned above, and suppose that c is not a coatom of (Cs￿
X ;600). Then, there
exists a coatom c0of (Cs￿
X ;600) such that c 6 c0 and c(A) ￿ c0(A) for some
A ￿ X. Since c0 is a coatom of (Cs￿
X ;600) there also exists a B ￿ X such
that c(B) ￿ c0(B) ￿ B. However, by de￿nition, #(B r c(B)) ￿ 1 whence
c(B) = c0(B) for any such B. It follows that c(A) ￿ c0(A) only if c0(A) = A.
By de￿nition of c, it follows that there exists A ￿ X such that fx;yg ￿ A,
c(A) 2 fA r fxg;A r fyggand c0(A) = A, while for some B ￿ X, c0(B) =
c(B) 2 fA r fxg;A r fygg. Suppose, without any loss of generality, that
c0(B) = c(B) = A r fyg. It follows, by WBCC, that there exists z 2
c0(B) such that y 2 c0c(fy;zg) whenever z 2 c0(fy;zg). By the previous
observation, y 2 c0c(fy;zg) entails c0c(fy;zg) = cc(fy;zg) i.e. c0(fy;zg) =
c(fy;zg) 6= fy;zg: thus, since by hypothesis c 2 C￿xy, it must be the case
that z = x, and c0(fx;yg) = c(fx;yg) = fxg. Hence, c0(fx;yg) = fxg while
there exists A ￿ X such that fx;yg ￿ A, and c0(A) = A, contradicting BNC.
As a result, any c 2 C￿ is a coatom of (Cs￿
X ;600).
Conversely, let c be a coatom of (Cs￿
X ;600) i.e. there exists A ￿ X such
that ? 6= c(A) ￿ A, and for any c0 2 Cs￿
X , if c(B) ￿ c0(B) for all B ￿ X
then c = c0. Notice that by ND #A ￿ 2. Suppose now that c = 2 C￿.
Then, for any x;y 2 X and any c0 2 C￿xy there exists a B0 ￿ X such that
c0(B0) ￿ c(B0): by de￿nition of C￿xy, it must be the case that fx;yg ￿ B0,
c0(B0) 2 fB0 r fxg;B0 r fygg hence c(B0) = B0. Now, consider any y 2 A
such that y = 2 c(A): by WBCC, there exists x 2 c(A) such that y = 2 c(fx;yg)
whenever x 2 c(fx;yg). But then, by BNC, there is no B ￿ X such that
fx;yg ￿ c(B), a contradiction since fx;yg ￿ B0 = c(B0). Therefore, any
coatom of (Cs￿
X ;600) belongs to C￿.
Furthermore, recall that any single-valued choice function c 2 C1
X is
VNMS-rationalizable by the complete dominance digraph (X;(X￿X)￿diag):
see Example 3 above. Then, observe that any c 2 C1
X is 6-minimal in C￿,
hence in Cs￿
X as well. Moreover, notice that for any two distinct c1;c2 2 C1
X,
c1 \ c2 = 2 C￿
X hence in particular c1 \ c2 = 2 Cs￿
X . Also, to check that Cs￿
X is
not [-closed, consider c1;c2 2 C1
X and three distinct x;y;z 2 X such that
c1(fx;y;zg) = fxg; c2(fx;y;zg) = fyg and c1(A) = c2(A) for any A ￿ X,
A 6= fx;y;zg. Then, (c1 [ c2)(fx;y;zg) = fx;yg, while #(c1 [ c2)(A) = 1
for any A ￿ X, A 6= fx;y;zg. It follows that c1 [ c2 violates BNS, hence
c1 [ c2 = 2 Cs
X (and therefore c1 [ c2 = 2 Cs￿
X ).
23(ii) The proof of point (i) also establishes that cidX is the maximum of
(Cs
X;60), and that any c 2 C￿ is a coatom of (Cs
X;60). Now, suppose that
there exists a coatom c￿ of (Cs
X;60) such that c￿ = 2 Cs￿
X (thus in particular
c￿ = 2 C￿). Hence, by de￿nition, there exists a nonempty A ￿ X such that
c￿(A) = ? and, for any x;y 2 X, c￿ = 2 C￿xy i.e. there exists a Bxy ￿
X such that fx;yg ￿ c￿(Bxy). Since c￿ 2 Cs
X, there exists a dominance
digraph (X;￿) such that c￿(Bxy) 2 S(Bxy;￿Bxy): thus by internal stability
￿Bxy \f(x;y);(y;x)g = ￿\f(x;y);(y;x)g = ?. But then, ￿ = ?: it follows
that c￿ = cidX, a contradiction.
Moreover, notice that the proof of point (i) establishes that Cs
X is not [-
closed. To check that Cs
X is not \-closed either, take any c;c0 2 C1
X such that
there exist two distinct x;y 2 X with c(fx;yg) = fxg and c0(fx;yg) = fyg,
and notice that, by construction, both c and c0 do satisfy ND, 2-PR, BNC,
WBCC and RVNMF. However, (c \ c0)(fx;yg) = ?, hence c \ c0 violates
2-PR and therefore c \ c0 = 2 Cs
X.
Remark 22 Notice that the foregoing Theorem only mentions a subclass
of minimal elements of (Cs
X;60), but does not provide a general, explicit
description of the set of all minimal elements of that poset. To be sure, some
general statement about the latter can be easily established. For instance, it
is certainly a minimal element of Cs
X any c 2 Cs
X such that i) its improper
subdomain D?
c = fY ￿ X : c(Y ) = ?g is set-inclusion maximal among the
improper subdomains of its fellow members of Cs
X and ii) c(Y ) is single-valued
whenever it is nonempty.
However, there may exist minimal elements of (Cs
X;60) other than those
described above. To check this statement, observe that if #X = 3 then
the set of minimal elements of the latter poset does indeed consist of those
c 2 CX such that c(X) = ?, #c(Y ) = 1 for any nonempty Y ￿ X, and
fc(Y ) : Y ￿ X, #Y = 2g = X, which are VNMS-rationalizable by 3-cyclic
dominance digraphs. On the other hand, if #X = 4;X = fx;y;z;wg then the
set of minimal elements of (Cs
X;60) includes among others any single-valued
c￿ 2 CX such that c￿(Y ) = fwg whenever w 2 Y ￿ X, c￿(fx;y;zg) = ?,












as well as some other single-valued c 2 CX, such that c(X) = c(fx;y;zg) =
?.
24Consider for instance c de￿ned as follows: c(X) = c(fx;y;zg) = c(fx;y;wg) =
?, c(fx;z;wg) = fwg, c(fy;z;wg) = fyg, c(fx;yg) = fxg, c(fx;zg) = fzg,
c(fx;wg) = fwg, c(fy;zg) = fyg, c(fy;wg) = fyg, c(fz;wg) = fwg which
is VNMS-rationalizable via ￿ = f(x;y);(y;z);(z;x);(w;x);(w;z);(y;w)g.
Clearly, fY ￿ X : c￿(Y ) = ?g ￿ fY ￿ X : c(Y ) = ?g.
6 Related literature
As mentioned in the Introduction, and to the best of the author￿ s knowledge,
the extant literature on revealed VNM-solutions essentially reduces to Wilson
(1970) and Suzumura (1983).
In order to characterize revealed VNM-solutions within the class of proper
partial choice functions, Wilson (1970) introduces a condition that we may
reformulate for arbitrary (total) choice functions as follows
Closure with respect to Full Choice-Set Revealed Conjugation (CFCRC):
for any A ￿ X such that c(A) 6= ?, n
x 2 A : xb R(c)y for all y 2 c(A)
o
￿ c(A).
Relying on Wilson￿ s seminal ideas, and in a similar vein, Suzumura (1983)
considers a related but stronger property, namely
Closure with respect to Full Choice-Set Revealed Dominance (CFCRD):
for any A ￿ X such that c(A) 6= ?,
fx 2 A : xR(c)y for all y 2 c(A)g ￿ c(A).
Notice that CFCRC and CFCRD are somewhat opaque and consider-
ably more convoluted than the properties of choice functions typically de-
scribed and used in the previous sections (except for the ￿ boundary￿condi-
tion RVNMF). Moreover, they are apparently more ad hoc than the latter
when it comes to characterizing revealed VNM-solutions, since both of them
make an explicit mention of ￿ revealed￿binary relations, imposing restrictions
on their relationships to choice sets.
Concerning CFCRC, the following Claim establishes its equivalence -
under 2-PR- to a combination of two simpler properties already considered
in Section 2, namely
25Claim 23 Let c 2 CX satisfy 2-PR. Then c satis￿es CFCRC i⁄ it satis￿es
both BNC and WBCC.
Proof. Let c 2 CX satisfy 2-PR and CFCRC, and take any A ￿ X and
x;y 2 A such that fx;yg ￿ c(A). Then, by de￿nition, b R(c) = fx;yg￿fx;yg
whence, by CFCRC, c(fx;yg) = fx;yg, and BNC holds. Moreover, let
B ￿ X such that c(B) 6= ?, and take any x 2 cc(B) (if c(B) = B there is
nothing to prove). Then, by CFCRC, there exists yx 2 c(B) such that not
xb R(c)yx i.e. there is no A ￿ X such that fx;yxg ￿ c(A). Thus, in particular
not fx;yxg ￿ c(fx;yxg) whence, by 2-PR, x 2 cc(fx;yxg) whenever yx 2
c(fx;yxg), and WBCC follows.
Conversely, let c satisfy both 2-PR, BNC and WBCC, A ￿ X, and x 2 A
such that xb R(c)y for any y 2 c(A) i.e. for any y 2 A there exists Axy ￿ X
with fx;yg ￿ c(Axy). Then, by BNC and 2-PR, c(fx;yg) = fx;yg for any
y 2 c(A). Now, suppose that x = 2 c(A). Then by WBCC there exists y 2 c(A)
such that x 2 cc(fx;yg) whenever y 2 c(fx;yg), a contradiction. It follows
that x 2 c(A), and CFCRC holds.
Thus, we obtain as an immediate Corollary to Theorem 17 and Claims 2
and 23 the next Proposition, that includes (a restatement in CX of) Wilson￿ s
characterization of nonempty-valued revealed VNM-solutions:
Proposition 24 (see also Wilson (1970)) Let c 2 CX. Then, the following
statements are equivalent:
(i) c satis￿es PR and is VNMS-rationalizable by a dominance digraph
(X;￿);
(ii) c satis￿es PR and is VNMS-rationalizable by (X;￿
b R(c));
(iii) c satis￿es PR and is a ￿xed point solution of 8-type for the (re￿exive)
digraph (X; b R(c));
(iv) c satis￿es PR and is a ￿xed point solution of 8-type;
(v) c satis￿es PR and CFCRC;
(vi) c satis￿es PR, BNC and WBCC.
Proof. (i)()(ii): See Lemma 14 and Theorem 17 above;
(ii)()(iii): See Claim 2 above;
(iii)()(iv): If c satis￿es PR and is a ￿xed point solution of 8-type then,
by Claim 2 and the equivalence between points (i) and (ii) above, it must be
26the case that c is also VNMS-rationalizable by (X;￿
b R(c)). Thus, by Claim 2
again, c is a ￿xed point solution of 8-type for the re￿ exive digraph (X; b R(c)).
The converse implication is trivial;
(iv)()(v): If c satis￿es PR and is a ￿xed point solution of 8-type then by
de￿nition there exists an R ￿ X￿X such that c(Y ) = fx 2 Y : xRy for all y 2 c(Y )g
hence in particular fx 2 Y : xRy for all y 2 c(Y )g ￿ c(Y ) for all nonempty
Y ￿ X, and conversely. In particular, R must be re￿ exive, otherwise there
exists x 2 X such that c(fxg) = ?, a contradiction since c satis￿es PR;
(v)()(vi): See Claim 23 above;
(i)()(vi): See Theorem 17 above.
Notice that Wilson￿ s own original result on nonempty-valued revealed
VNM- solutions -just sketched with no explicit proof in Wilson (1970), and
scarcely mentioned in the subsequent, otherwise very comprehensive, Suzu-
mura￿ s monograph (Suzumura (1983))- consists of the equivalence between
statements (iii), (iv), (v): the equivalence between (i), (ii), and (iii) is just
taken for granted - with (X; b R(c)) regarded as an ￿ undominance￿(i.e. re-
￿ exive) digraph- but not spelled out in any detail. Needless to say, the
equivalence between (vi) and the former statements is not considered at all
in any of those works.
Another immediate consequence of Claim 23 is an alternative, equivalent
formulation of Theorem 19, namely
Proposition 25 Let c 2 CX . Then c satis￿es ND, 2-PR, CFCRC and
RVNMF i⁄ c is VNMS-rationalizable by a dominance digraph (X;￿).
Proof. Straightforward, by Theorem 19 and Claim 23 above.
The implications of all of the above are quite clear: essentially, Wilson￿ s
characterization may be lifted to non-proper choice functions just introducing
two supplementary local-nonemptiness conditions for choice sets -namely ND
and 2-PR- and the boundary condition RVNMF for empty choice sets.
Concerning CFCRD, Suzumura himself proceeds to unpack that condi-
tion in terms of simpler, more transparent properties (see Suzumura (1983)).
We ￿nd it useful to restate and slightly enrich Suzumura￿ s result in our
own setting, o⁄ering a further characterization of the subclass of revealed
VNM-solutions it covers. This allows us to gain another perspective on -and
perhaps a more immediate appreciation of - the boundaries of Suzumura￿ s
27theorem, which amounts to the equivalence between statements (iv),(v),(vi)
and (vii) of the following
Proposition 26 (see also Suzumura (1983)) Let c 2 CX. Then, the follow-
ing statements are equivalent:
(i) c satis￿es PR and is VNMS-rationalizable by an asymmetric domi-
nance digraph (X;￿) such that C(Y;￿Y) 2 S(Y;￿Y) for any Y ￿ X;
(ii) c satis￿es PR and is a ￿xed point solution of 8-type for the (total)
digraph (X;R￿);
(iii) c satis￿es PR and is a ￿xed point solution of 8-type for a total di-
graph;
(iv) c satis￿es PR, and there exists a quasitransitive R ￿ X ￿ X -i.e.
Ra is transitive- such that c(Y ) = maxRY for any Y ￿ X;
(v) c satis￿es PR and is VNMS-rationalizable by (X;(R(c))a);
(vi) c satis￿es PR and CFCRD;
(vii) c satis￿es PR, C, SS and CO.
Proof. (i)()(ii) It follows from Claim 2, noticing that ￿ is asymmetric
i⁄ for any x;y 2 X, not [x￿y and y￿x] i.e. either not x￿y or not y￿x,
namely i⁄ R￿ is total;
(ii)=)(iii) This implication is trivial;
(iii)=)(i) Again from Claim 2, and by the same argument of the pre-
vious equivalence between points (i) and (ii), applied to a total R and the
corresponding asymmetric ￿R;
(i))(iv) Since, as it is well-known, whenever the core of (Y;￿Y) is a
VNM-stable set of (Y;￿Y) it is also its unique VNM-stable set, it follows
that c(Y ) = C(Y;￿Y) for any Y ￿ X, hence c is in particular the core-
solution of (X;￿) (and, by hypothesis, nonempty-valued). Then, consider
R￿ i.e. for any x;y 2 X posit xR￿y i⁄ not y￿x. Clearly, by de￿nition,
c(Y ) = maxR￿
Y for any Y ￿ X. Now, suppose (R￿)a is not transitive: then,
there exist x;y;z 2 X such that x(R￿)ay, y(R￿)az, and not x(R￿)az i.e.
by de￿nition again x￿y, not y￿x, y￿z, not z￿y, and -since x￿z and z￿x
would imply c(fx;zg) = C(fx;zg;￿fx;zg) = ?, a contradiction- both not
z￿x and not x￿z. But then, consider c(fx;y;zg). Clearly, c(fx;y;zg) =
C(fx;y;zg;￿fx;y;zg) = fxg. However, S(fx;y;zg;￿fx;y;zg) = ffx;zgg hence
c is not VNMS-rationalizable, a contradiction.
(iv) () (v) This is part of the original Suzumura￿ s characterization
result (see e.g. Wilson (1970) and Suzumura (1983), Theorem 2.10 (b),
pp.36-38).
28(v))(i) Suppose that c is VNMS-rationalizable by (X;(R(c))a), that is
indeed an asymmetric dominance digraph. Let us now assume that c is
not a core-solution of (X;(R(c))a), i.e. there exists a Y ￿ X such that
c(Y ) 6= C(Y;(R(c))a
Y). Since by hypothesis ? 6= c(Y ) 2 S(Y;(R(c))a
Y),
and -by a well-known fact- the core of any dominance digraph (Y;￿Y) is a
subset of any VNM-stable set of (Y;￿Y), it must then be the case that there
exists y 2 Y n c(Y ) ￿ Y n C(Y;(R(c))a
Y) such that not x(R(c))a
Yy, for any
x 2 c(Y ). Therefore, there exists z 2 Y n c(Y ) (hence z = 2 C(Y;(R(c))a
Y))
such that z(R(c))a
Yy. Moreover, since z = 2 C(Y;(R(c))a
Y), there also exists
u 2 Y such that u(R(c))az. It follows that u(R(c))ay, by transitivity of (R)a,
hence u = 2 c(Y ) in view of our previous assumption about y. Thus, again,
u = 2 C(Y;(R(c))a
Y) as well, and of course u 6= z by construction. But then,
we may apply the very same argument starting from u to obtain a further
v = 2 fz;ug [ C(Y;(R(c))a
Y) and so on inde￿nitely to the e⁄ect of obtaining a
contradiction, in view of ￿niteness of X.
(v)()(vi) See Suzumura (1983), Theorem 2.10 (b).
(vi)()(vii) This is also part of the original Suzumura￿ s characterization
result (see Suzumura (1983), Theorems 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7 pp. 32-34, and
Theorem 2.10 (b), pp. 36-38).
It should be remarked here that, quite unsurprisingly, C, SS and CO
amount to a considerably higher degree of choice-set-consistency than that
exhibited by general VNMS-rationalizable choice functions. Indeed, as no-
ticed above, the Suzumura-Wilson subclass of VNM-solutions does essentially
correspond to the special case of revealed dominance digraphs inducing VNM-
stable sets that are unique because they are precisely the cores (i.e. the sets
of all undominated outcomes) of the relevant subdigraphs.
7 Concluding remarks
Choice functions which may be regarded as VNM-solutions of an underly-
ing dominance digraph (X;￿) have been characterized both under VNM-
perfection of (X;￿) and in the general case. Both characterizations combine
restrictions on nonemptiness of the choice sets and weak contraction consis-
tency requirements on choice sets and rejection sets. The characterization
provided here for the general case makes use of a property that explicitly
forbids the existence of VNM-stable sets of certain digraphs and is to that
29extent somewhat opaque. Finding a more transparent and elegant one is an
open problem, whose solution might have to wait for further progress on the
related characterization problem for kernel-perfect digraphs.
8 Appendix
On a representation of dominance digraphs by games in coalitional
and in strategic form
A coalitional game form is a triple G = (N;X;E) where N and X are
non-empty sets denoting the sets of players and outcomes, respectively, and
E : P(N) ! P(P(X)) is the coalitional power function: the ￿ power-value￿
E(S) of coalition S ￿ N is the collection of all events A ￿ X coalition S ￿ N
is able to ￿ force￿(under some suitable interpretation of the latter notion). We
also assume #N ￿ 2 and #X ￿ 2 in order to avoid trivialities. A coalitional
game form G = (N;X;E) is a (standard) e⁄ectivity function if E satis￿es
the following boundary conditions:
EF1) Souvereignty: E(N) ￿ P(X)nf;g;
EF2) Null Set Normalization: E(;) = ;;
EF3) Exhaustiveness: X 2 E(S) for any S; ; 6= S ￿ N:
EF4) Null Event Unenforceability: ; = 2 E(S) for any S , ; ￿ S ￿ N .
A CGF is N-monotonic i⁄ for any S;T ￿ N and any A ￿ X
[A 2 E(S) and S ￿ T entail A 2 E(T)],
X-monotonic i⁄ for any S ￿ N and any A;B ￿ X
[A 2 E(S) and A ￿ B entail B 2 E(S)], and monotonic i⁄it is both N-
monotonic and X-monotonic. Moreover, it is superadditive i⁄for any S;T ￿
N and A;B ￿ X; A 2 E(S); B 2 E(T) and S \ T = ; entail A \ B 2
E(S [ T).
A coalitional game (with preference preorders) induced by coalitional
game form G = (N;X;E) is a tuple g = (N;X;E;(<i)i2N) where for any
i 2 N, <i￿ X ￿ X is a preorder i.e. a transitive and re￿ exive binary
relation (with symmetric and asymmetric components denoted ￿iand ￿i,
respectively).
A strategic game (with preference preorders) is a tuple
￿ = (N;X;(Si)i2N;h;(<i)i2N) where Si denotes player i￿ s strategy set,
and h 2 X￿iSi denotes the strategic outcome function.
The ￿-coalitional game attached to strategic game
30￿ = (N;X;(Si)i2N;h;(<i)i2N) is the tuple g￿(￿) = (N;X;E￿
￿;(<i)i2N)
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A coalitional game g is ￿-playable if there exists a strategic game such
that g = g￿(￿).
The following dominance digraphs can be attached in a natural way to
any coalitional game g = (N;X;E;(<i)i2N):
(i) (X;￿￿￿
g ), where for any x;y 2 X, x;y 2 X, x￿￿￿
g y i⁄ there exist
A ￿ X and S ￿ N such that
x 2 A 2 E(S) and z ￿i y for all i 2 S and z 2 A
(ii) (X;￿￿￿
g ), where for any x;y 2 X, x￿￿￿
g y i⁄ there exist A ￿ X and
S ￿ N such that
x 2 A 2 E(S) and x ￿i y for all i 2 S .
The following representation results can be easily established:
Proposition 27 (i) Let g = (N;X;E;(<i)i2N) be a coalitional game as
de￿ned above. Then both (X;￿￿￿
g ) and (X;￿￿￿
g ) are dominance digraphs;
(ii) let (X;￿) be an asymmetric dominance digraph. Then, there exists a
coalitional game with preference preorders g = (N;X;E;(<i)i2N) such that
￿ = ￿￿￿
g = ￿￿￿
g : Moreover, g is ￿-playable .
Proof. (i) Indeed, suppose there exists x 2 X with x￿￿
gx (where ￿ 2
fa￿;￿
￿g). Then, in both cases there exist A ￿ X and S ￿ N such that
x 2 A 2 E(S), and x ￿i x for all i 2 S, a contradiction.
(ii) Let x;y 2 X, and x￿y. Then, ￿x a bijection ￿xy on X such that
￿xy(x) = x;￿xy(y) = y, and take two distinct players ixy, jxy with pref-
erence preorders ￿ixyand ￿jxysuch that x ￿ixy y ￿ixy [X n fx;yg] and
[X n fx;yg]￿1 ￿iyx x ￿iyx y (where [X n fx;yg] denotes some ￿xed linear
order on X n fx;yg and [X n fx;yg]￿1its reverse order).
Next, posit N￿ = [(x;y)2￿ fixy;jxyg, and de￿ne E￿ : P(N) ! P(P(X))
by the following rule: for any A ￿ X and S ￿ N￿ , A 2 E￿(S) i⁄
S 6= ? and A = X or #S >
#N￿
2 and A 6= ?. Now, consider g￿ =
(N￿;X;E￿;(<i)i2N) (this is essentially a slightly generalized version of the
standard McGarvey construction: see e.g. Laslier (1997), chpt.2). It is easily
checked that, by construction, for each x;y 2 X, if x￿y and not y￿x then
#fi 2 N￿ : x ￿i yg > #N￿
2 > #fi 2 N￿ : y ￿i xg,
31while #fi 2 N￿ : x ￿i yg = #N￿
2 = #fi 2 N￿ : y ￿i xg if either (not
x￿y and not y￿x) or (x￿y and y￿x).




g￿y. Conversely, if x￿￿￿
g￿y (x￿
￿￿
g￿y, respectively) then by de￿nition there
exist S ￿ N￿, A ￿ X such that #S > #N￿
2 ; x 2 A 2 E(S), u ￿i y for all
i 2 S and all u 2 A (x ￿i y for all i 2 S, respectively), whence in any case
x￿y by de￿nition of E￿.
Moreover, it is easily checked that E￿ is in fact a monotonic and superad-
ditive e⁄ectivity function. Hence g￿ is ￿-playable by Theorem 5.6 in Otten,
Borm, Storcken and Tijs (1995).
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